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This paper tests Wagner’s Law for China and Taiwan, using annual time series data 
covering the period 1979-2002. To estimate the long-run relationship between government 
expenditures and output, we use a robust estimation method known as the Bounds Test 
based on Unrestricted Error Correction Model (UECM) estimation (Pesaran et al. (2001)). 
Empirical results from the Bounds Test indicate that there exists no long-run relationship 
between government expenditures and output in China and Taiwan. Furthermore, Toda and 
Yamamoto’s (1995) Granger non-causality test results also show that Wagner’s Law does 
not hold for China and Taiwan over this same period. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past three decades, several studies have been devoted to test the validity of 
Wagner’s Law, which postulates the tendency for government activities to expand along 
with economic expansion. Empirical tests of this law have yielded results that differ 
considerably from country to country. Several multi-country studies have been conducted, 
an example being the studies of Wagner and Weber (1977) which tests the law for 34 
nations during the post World War II era. With the exception of France, Germany and 
Iceland, Wagner and Weber conclude that most Western democracies show trends 
supporting Wagner’s Law. Studies done by Abisadeh and Gray (1985) cover the period 
1963-1979 for 53 countries and point out that Wagner’s Law holds true for the 
developing countries but not for poor and developed countries. On the other hand, 
studies by Ram (1986) examines 63 countries for the period 1950-1980 and finds limited 
support for Wagner’s Law. Similarly, results presented by Afxentiou and Serletis (1996) 
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examine six European countries (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) over the period 1961-1991, also finding no strong evidence to support 
Wagner’s Law in relation to any of these countries. The studies of Ansari et al. (1997) 
for three African countries, Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, also find no evidence 
supporting Wagner’s Law. However, a recent studies by Chang (2002) examines three 
emerging countries in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) as well as three 
industrialized countries (Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom) over the 
period 1951-1996, with the exception of Thailand, again supports the validity of 
Wagner’s Law. The validity of Wagner’s Law is further supported by country-specific 
studies, such as those presented by Ganti and Kalluri (1979), Yousefi and Abizadeh 
(1992), and Islam (2001) which have studied the law for the U.S., Khan (1990) for 
Pakistan, Gyles (1990) for the U.K., and Nomura (1995) for Japan. There is however, 
still a dissent among recent research as the studies of Mann (1980), Nagarajan and 
Spears (1990) and Lin (1995), which have obtained mixed results concerning the 
validity of Wagner’s Law for Mexico, Chletsos and Kollias (1997) for Greece, and Pluta 
(1979) for Taiwan. The studies of Singh and Sahni (1984), and Afxentiou and Serletis 
(1991) for Canada, Henrekson (1993) for Sweden, and Burney (2002) for Kuwait do not 
support the Wagner’s Law. In general, current studies do not support the Wagner’s Law 
for under-developed or developed countries. 
While previous studies focus mostly on the industrial and developing countries, this 
study attempts to contribute to the line of research using the Bounds Test proposed by 
Pesaran et al. (2001), and Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) Granger non-causality test to 
examine Wagner’s Law for China and Taiwan. The reason why China and Taiwan are 
selected in this study is as follows. Taiwan is one of the recently industrialized countries 
of Asia and is the world’s third largest holder of foreign exchange reserves after Japan 
and China. Furthermore, of the previously mentioned studies, only the studies presented 
by Pluta (1979) and Chang (2002) have been on Taiwan. Similarly, China has made 
remarkable economic progress over last few decades and its economic growth rate over 
the past decade (1990-2002) has been 9.48%. At the end of 2002, China became the 
world’s fourth largest trading country with foreign exchange reserves of nearly US$290 
billion. Another interesting area is that, China had only implemented an “Open-Door” 
policy in the late 1970s, and thus sufficient data are available for researchers to evaluate 
the effects of economic liberalization in various economic phenomena. However, since 
previous studies have not focused on this issue in relation to China, this study will be the 
first to test for the relationship with this specific situation of China with Wagner’s Law. 
 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Empirically, Wagner’s Law investigates the long-run relationships between 
government size (as generally denoted by government expenditures) and the economy 
(as conventionally denoted by output). Since there are different measures of government GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN CHINA AND TAIWAN  141 
size and output, there are different empirical versions of Wagner’s Law. In this study, 
following Mann’s (1980) study, five different versions of Wagner’s Law are employed. 
To be consistent with most of the empirical versions of Wagner’s Law, this study uses 
real terms of government expenditures. The five different models of testing Wagner’s 
Law are presented as follows: 
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where RG = real total government expenditures, RGDP = real GDP, N = population, 
RGDP/N = real GDP per capita, RG/N = real total government expenditures per capita, 
and RG/RGDP = the ratio of real total government expenditures to real GDP. Models 1 
and 2 refer to the “traditional” Peacock-Wiseman version (Peacock and Wiseman 
(1967)) and Goffman version (Goffman (1968)), respectively. Model 3 represents the 
Gupta/Michas version (Gupta (1967), Michas (1975)), model 4 represents the Musgrave 
version (Musgrave (1969)), and the Peacock-Wiseman “share” version is displayed in 
model 5. The major differences among these five versions are measures of government 
size and the economy. Government size is measured by real total government 
expenditures (in models 1 and 2), real total government expenditures per capita (in 
model 3), or real total government expenditures as proportion of real GDP (in models 4 
and 5). The economy is measured by real GDP (in models 1 and 5) or real GDP per 
capita (in models 2, 3 and 4). 
The bounds test proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is employed in this study because 
Pesaran  et al.’s approach has two main advantages over the common practice of 
cointegration analysis (Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius 
(1990)). First, the bounds test procedure can be applied irrespective of whether the 
explanatory variables are I(0) or I(1). Second, the methodology can be applied to studies 
with samples that are small in scale (Mah (2000)), as is the case in this study. For data with 
small sample sizes, no cointegrating relationship can be made among variables that are I(1) 
(Kremers et al. (1992)) and the ECM and Johansen (1988) methods are not reliable (Mah 
(2000)). Furthermore, the conventional ADF test (like many other unit root tests) suffers CHIUNG-JU HUANG  142 
from poor size and power properties especially in small samples (Harris (1995)). 
Since our study has a very small sample size (24 observations), the cointegration 
relationships for our five versions of the Wagner’s Law model are estimated using the 
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where   and   are the first differences of the logarithms of Y and X, 
respectively. Y represents real total government expenditures in models 1 and 2, real total 
government expenditures per capita in model 3, and the ratio of real total government 
expenditures to real GDP in models 4 and 5. X represents real GDP in models 1 and 5 and 
represents real GDP per capita in models 2, 3, and 4. K is the optimal lag length for UECM; 
t Y d ln t X d ln
ε   is a disturbance term assuming white noise and normal distribution. 
Following Pesaran et al. (2001), the test is conducted in the following way. The null 
hypothesis is tested by considering the UECM in Equation (6) and excluding the lagged 
variables lnY and lnX, based on the Wald or F-statistic. The asymptotic distribution of 
the F-statistic is non-standard under the null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship 
between the examined variables, irrespective of whether the underlying explanatory 
variables are purely I(0) or I(1). More formally, we perform a joint significance test, 
where the null hypothesis is 
 
0 : 0 4 3 = = a a H  
 
For some significance level of  α , if the F-statistic falls outside the critical bound, a 
conclusive inference can be made without considering the order of integration of the 
underlying regressors. For instance, if the F-statistic is higher (lower) than the upper 
(lower) critical bound, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected (accepted). 
In the case when the F-statistic falls inside the upper and lower bounds, a conclusive 
inference cannot be made. Here, the order of integration for the underlying explanatory 
variables must be known before any conclusion can be drawn. 
In this study, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality tests are performed to test 
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Here,   and    are the logarithms of Y and X, respectively; K is the optimal 
lag length;   is the maximum order of integration in the system. As mentioned 
before, Y represents RG for models 1 and 2, RG/N for model 3, and RG/GDP for models 
t Y ln t X ln
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4 and 5. X represents RGDP for models 1 and 5 and GDP/N for models 2, 3, and 4. This 
allows us to test the null hypothesis that there is no Granger causality from X to Y, i.e., to 
test  , i = 1, 2, …, K. 0 : 2 0 = i a H
1 a Wald test, which is asymptotically distributed as a 
 can be performed. The advantage of this procedure, as argued by Zapata and 
Rambaldi (1997), is that it does not require knowledge of the cointegration properties of 
the system. It has a normal limiting chi-square distribution, and the usual lag selection 
procedure to the system can be applied even if there is no cointegration and/or the 
stability and rank conditions are not satisfied “…so long as the order of integration of 
the process does not exceed the true lag length of the model…” (see Toda and 




3.    THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The data used in this study are real GDP, real government expenditures, and 
population. The annual data covers the period 1979-2002. The data for China are 
obtained from IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the data for Taiwan are taken 
from the EPS/AREMOS data base of the Taiwan Ministry of Education. 
 
 
Table 1.    Bounds Testing for Cointegration Analysis 





1  RG, RGDP  K = 2 0.37566  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
2  RG, RGDP/N  K = 1 0.56367  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
3  RG/N, RGDP/N  K = 1 0.57347  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
4  RG/RGDP, RGDP/N  K = 1 0.69589  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
5  RG/RGDP, RGDP  K = 1 0.66524  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
Taiwan 
1  RG, RGDP  K = 1 1.6204  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
2  RG, RGDP/N  K = 1 1.7972  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
3  RG/N, RGDP/N  K = 1 1.6272  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
4  RG/RGDP, RGDP/N  K = 1 1.5826  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
5  RG/RGDP, RGDP  K = 1 1.5882  4.04-4.78  4.94-5.73 
Notes: Lag structure of K was selected based on the Schwartz criterion. The bounds critical values are 
obtained from Table CI(iii) Case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend for one regressor (Pesaran et al. 
 
1 According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995), if   (here,   are   and  , respectively) 
follows a VAR(K), we can then use standard causality tests, provided the VAR is augmented by d additional 
lags that are ignored in the causality test. In this study, the d is chosen as 0 and 1 for all of the models. 
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(2001), p. 300).   
The Bounds Test results are reported in Table 1.
2 The computed F-statistic for five 
different Wagner’s Law models for China all appear to be lower than the lower bounds 
critical values of 4.94 and 4.04 at 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. These 
results indicate that there exists no cointegration between RG and RGDP in model 1, RG 
and RGDP/N in model 2, RG/N and RGDP/N in model 3, RG/GDP and RGDP/N in 
model 4, and RG/RGDP and RGDP in model 5. For Taiwan, the computed F-statistics 
for five different Wagner’s Law models show similar results. Generally speaking, these 
results indicate that there exists no cointegration between government size and the 
economy in China and Taiwan over this test period. Empirically, Wagner’s Law 
investigates the long-run relations between government size and the economy. If 
Wagner’s Law statically holds true, it makes sense to conclude that a cointegration 
relationship (long-run relationship) should exist between government size and the 
economy. However, empirical results show that no such cointegration relationship can 
be found between government size and the economy in China and Taiwan. Therefore, 
the validity of Wagner’s Law is not held for China and Taiwan. 
 
Table 2.    Granger Causality Test for China based on Toda and Yamamoto Test 
Model d  0 H   P-value 
Output does not cause government expenditures 
1 0  RGDP does not cause RG 0.0954 
 1    0.4768 
2 0  RGDP/N does not cause RG 0.4208 
 1    0.1485 
3 0 RGDP/N does not cause RG/N 0.2413 
 1    0.1329 
4 0  RGDP/N does not cause RG/RGDP 0.0062* 
 1    0.7561 
5 0  RGDP does not cause RG/RGDP 0.0063* 
 1    0.7238 
Government expenditures does not cause output 
1 0  RG does not cause RGDP 0.8801 
 1    0.8609 
2 0  RG does not cause RGDP/N 0.8807 
 1    0.0554 
3 0 RG/N does not cause RGDP/N 0.7371 
 1    0.0515 
4 0  RG/RGDP does not cause RGDP/N 0.7371 
 1    0.0515 
5 0  RG/RGDP does not cause RGDP 0.6837 
 1    0.0617 
Note:    is the maximum order of integration in the system and, in our system, it is one.  max d
* Denotes 5% level of significance. 
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Table 3.    Granger Causality Test for Taiwan based on Toda and Yamamoto Test 
Model  d  0 H   P-value 
Output does not cause government expenditures 
1 0  RGDP does not cause RG 0.0407* 
 1    0.2031 
2 0  RGDP/N does not cause RG 0.0360* 
 1    0.1610 
3 0 RGDP/N does not cause RG/N 0.0391* 
 1    0.1824 
4 0  RGDP/N does not cause RG/RGDP 0.5705 
 1    0.5535 
5 0  RGDP does not cause RG/RGDP 0.5880 
 1    0.5615 
Government expenditures does not cause output 
1 0  RG does not cause RGDP 0.7662 
 1    0.7239 
2 0  RG does not cause RGDP/N 0.9182 
 1    0.7953 
3 0 RG/N does not cause RGDP/N 0.7394 
 1    0.7207 
4 0  RG/RGDP does not cause RGDP/N 0.7394 
 1    0.7206 
5 0  RG/RGDP does not cause RGDP 0.7662 
 1    0.7239 
Note:    is the maximum order of integration in the system and, in our system, it is one.  max d
* Denotes 5% level of significance. 
 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of the Granger non-causality tests performed 
for China and Taiwan respectively, based on the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach. 
Toda and Yamamoto’s studies clearly point to the independence between output and 
government expenditures in most of the cases, with a few exceptions where d is set to 
zero. Our empirical results support neither the Wagner’s Law postulate, which states that 
as economic activity grows there is a tendency for government activities to increase, nor 
the Keynesian view, which states that the fiscal policy variables are major determinants 
of economic growth. As a matter of fact, in a large country like China with a strong 
power-based government, we would not expect economic growth and government 
activity to reinforce each other. Apparently, these empirical results are consistent with 
our expectations. Unlike the findings earlier by reported by Chang (2002), our empirical 
results do not support the validity of Wagner’s Law for Taiwan. Nevertheless, it is worth 
pointing out here that our results are consistent with those found in previous empirical CHIUNG-JU HUANG  146 
studies which provide no evidence that supports Wagner’s Law in relation to most 
industrial and developing countries. The major findings of our study have important 
implications within the economic and governmental system. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this study we empirically test Wagner’s Law for China and Taiwan over the 
1979-2002 period, using Bounds Test proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and Toda and 
Yamamoto’s (1995) Granger non-causality tests. The results from the Bounds Test 
indicate that there exists no long-run relationship between government size and the 
economy either in China or in Taiwan. Furthermore, Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) 
causality test results also show that Wagner’s Law does not hold for China and Taiwan 
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